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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR GRIFFITH: Welcome. Good evening. My name is
Sean Griffith. I am the T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law here at
Fordham Law School. And I am also Director of the Fordham
Corporate Law Center.
I am delighted to welcome you all to the 13th Annual A.A.
Sommer, Jr. Lecture. Our speaker tonight is Benjamin M. Lawsky,
Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial
Services. His topic tonight is “Regulating in an Evolving Financial
Landscape.” In a few minutes, Ben Indek, Partner at Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius will introduce Superintendent Lawsky.
But first I have the privilege of welcoming you and making a few
introductory remarks, first about the Sommer Lecture itself. The
Sommer Lecture is co-sponsored by Morgan Lewis and the Corporate
Law Center, and it honors the legacy of former SEC Commissioner and
former securities law practitioner Al Sommer. Mr. Sommer was a
guiding light on the Commission, an outstanding lawyer, and a mentor
to many scholars and practitioners of securities law. The annual
Sommer Lecture is the Corporate Law Center’s longest running tradition
here at Fordham Law School. And at the 2007 Sommer Lecture, our
speaker, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, remarked that the Sommer
Lecture has become a prominent feature in the ongoing dialogue among
security regulators, practitioners, and the regulated community, and I
know that the lecture will continue that tradition tonight.
The Sommer Lecture is hosted by the Fordham Corporate Law
Center, and I will just mention what we do at the Corporate Law
Center—we serve as the Law School’s nexus for discourse on issues of
business law and policy. We like to call the Center the platform from
which the Law School launches its graduates on a business law
trajectory and from which it launches its faculty members on their
scholarly endeavors. The Center has three principle target audiences
and three target interests. First, public lectures like this one seek to
bring headline speakers to the Law School to speak to a community of
alumni, faculty, friends, and students. Second, we focus on our
academic events. We bring scholars from around the country and
around the world to the Law School. Thirdly, we bring friends and
alumni back for our students, to provide them with networking
opportunities and opportunities to learn how to get there from here.
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The Corporate Law Center is especially excited about its new
initiative in the area of Corporate Compliance. This summer, the
Corporate Law Center is going to start the first annual meeting of the
Corporate Compliance Institute, a three-week intensive training program
to “retool” lawyers in the area of corporate compliance. We hope to
launch an LL.M. program in the area of Corporate Compliance soon
after that. We see that as a growth area for us and for Fordham Law
School.
Before I turn the podium over to Ben, I just want to thank and
acknowledge a number of people here tonight. First of all, John Peloso,
who is Of Counsel at the Morgan Lewis firm and was the driving force
behind the creation of both the Corporate Law Center and the Sommer
Lecture. We are very grateful to John for the many contributions that he
has made to the Law School and the partnership that he had helped us
forge with the Morgan Lewis firm and now with Ben Indek. We also
want to thank the SEC Historical Society for being a part of this event
and the Executive Director of that Society, Carla Rosati, who is here
tonight. The Society shares, preserves, and advances the knowledge and
the history of financial regulation through its virtual museum and an
archive available online at www.sechistorical.org. The Society recently
celebrated its tenth anniversary. Also, I want to acknowledge the
members of the Sommer family who are here with us tonight: Mrs.
Starr Sommer, her daughter Susan Futter, and her son-in-law Jeff Futter.
They traveled here to join us for the Sommer lecture as they often do,
and their presence underscores the special relationship that Fordham had
and has with Al Sommer, and the memory of Al Sommer. We are
grateful also obviously to the members of the New York State
Department of Financial Services who are here with us tonight
accompanying Superintendent Lawsky. This event was going to take
place on November 1st, and intervening events, a little annoying visit
from someone named Sandy, got in the way of that event. We are very
pleased that you were able to make time and reschedule the program for
us tonight. I also want to thank my colleagues in the audience for
attending tonight.
Now, it is my pleasure to turn the microphone over to Ben Indek
from Morgan Lewis.
BEN A. INDEK: Good evening everybody. On behalf of Morgan
Lewis, I would also like to welcome you to the 13th Annual A.A.
Sommer Jr. Lecture.
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More than 30 years ago, Al Sommer started the Morgan Lewis
Securities Practice and as a way to honor his role, we created this lecture
series. As Sean was mentioning, Al was a Morgan Lewis partner from
1979 until 1994. He then became Counsel to the firm. Al was an
outstanding public servant. He was an SEC Commissioner from 1973 to
1976. He also served as Chairman of the Public Oversight Board and as
a public member of the AICPA. In private practice, he was a trusted
boardroom lawyer, a prolific author, and an expert commentator on a
wide range of securities law topics. With the assistance of many other
lawyers, several of whom regularly participate in this event, Al
strengthened and expanded our securities law practice.
Today we have more than 100 lawyers in about a dozen cities
around the world devoted to providing advice regarding the securities
law to financial institutions and public companies. The Morgan Lewis
Securities Group now mirrors the structure of the SEC. We practice in
the securities enforcement and litigation areas, trading and markets,
investment management and corporate finance. Al participated in the
first two lectures we held at Fordham Law School. Some of you may
remember him quizzing the lecturer on particular parts of their remarks.
Sadly, Al passed away in 2002. Nevertheless, we are delighted that his
family, as Sean mentioned, continues their close relationship with
Morgan Lewis and Fordham. We are also thankful to the SEC
Historical Society as Sean mentioned.
Like Al, our speaker tonight, Superintendent Benjamin M. Lawsky
is also committed to public service. And I am confident that Al would
have heartily complimented Mr. Lawsky for his dedication to
government service. Prior to helping to create and lead the New York
State Department of Financial Services, Mr. Lawsky served as Chief
Counsel to Senator Charles Schumer on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of New York, as Deputy Counselor and Special Assistant to
then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and as Governor Cuomo’s Chief
of Staff. Finally, in addition to leading the Department of Financial
Services, his day job, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, Mr. Lawsky
was tapped by Governor Cuomo as co-chair of the Moreland
Commission, which has been charged with investigating the preparation
of and response by New York’s power companies to Sandy and
Hurricane Irene. And we appreciate Mr. Lawsky coming tonight after
our original date in November was postponed due to Sandy.
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Although separated by a generation, it was also clear to me that Mr.
Lawsky and Al had a common view on the role of government
regulation. After being nominated by Governor Cuomo to serve as the
Superintendent of Financial Services in 2011, Mr. Lawsky articulated
several objectives for the new department. Remarkably, certain of Mr.
Lawsky’s goals were consistent with those articulated by Al as an SEC
Commissioner in the mid 1970s. For example, Mr. Lawsky has stated
that one of the more important goals of the Department of Financial
Services is to make sure that it is “right-sized and wisely structured” and
that it needed to focus on “eliminating redundancies and waste.” In a
speech he delivered while on the Commission called “The Delicate
Balance of Regulation and Competition,” Al commented, and I am
quoting here, that “it is imperative that every effort be made by the SEC
to eliminate duplication” in its rules and regulations.1
As another example, in creating the Department of Financial
Services, Mr. Lawsky was mindful that a regulator must be “nimble”
and one that didn’t “stifle innovation.”2 By doing so, the Department
could contribute in a positive way to New York’s economic future. In
the same speech just quoted from Al 40 years ago, Al suggested that
where it could responsibly do so, the SEC should foster competition,
rather than regulation.
Finally, as regulators, Mr. Lawky and Al understood that it is
critical to forcefully enforce the law against wrongdoers. Mr. Lawsky
said, “. . . we must remain vigilant against fraud in our markets and
against consumers.”3 Al himself could have written those words. In
fact, he put it a bit more colorfully in a 1974 speech when he said
“. . . our enforcement efforts must be strengthened and promoted
vigorously. There is other than education, nothing that can serve the
public better than ferreting out the frauds and putting them out of
business, throwing sand in their schemes, making the risk too heavy, as
compared to the potential gains.”4

1. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Address at North American
Securities Administrators Association 58th Annual Conference (Sept. 8, 1975).
2. Benjamin M. Lawsky, Testimony Before the New York Senate Committees on
Insurance and Banking (May 18, 2011), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/
speeches_testimony/t110518.htm.
3. Id.
4. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Address to North American Securities
Administrators (Sept. 24, 1974).
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Those who paid attention last summer to the Department of
Financial Services’ pursuit of charges against an international bank
regarding processing transactions on behalf of Iranian customers would
have little doubt that Mr. Lawsky would have agreed with Al’s view. In
turn, I know that Al would have been keenly interested to hear Mr.
Lawsky’s lecture this evening. At Morgan Lewis, we are proud of Al
Sommers’ affiliation with the firm and delighted to sponsor this annual
lecture in his honor.
I am pleased to turn the podium over to our speaker tonight,
Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial
Services, Benjamin Lawsky.
LECTURE: REGULATING IN AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE
BENJAMIN M. LAWSKY: The theme of what I want to talk with
you about today, “Regulating in an Evolving Financial Landscape,”
speaks to a unique set of challenges that we now face together as
financial regulators and as a country.
In the wake of a devastating financial crisis, lawmakers, regulators,
the financial industry, consumer advocates, and a wide range of other
stakeholders are building the new architecture of a reformed Wall Street.
That’s a dynamic, ongoing process.
As you well know, it didn’t end the day—three years ago, on July
21, 2010—when the President signed Dodd-Frank into law.
Through Dodd-Frank, the President and Congress provided
regulators in Washington with a robust framework for reform. But they
left the specific contours of those new rules of the road up to a set of
federal agencies writing regulations on matters as diverse as the Volcker
Rule, living wills, orderly liquidation authority, risk retention, qualified
residential mortgages—and a whole long list of other terms and
acronyms that were foreign to us only a few short years ago.
While regulators in Washington have made important progress
implementing those critical reforms—the rules of the road are still not
yet fully written.
And, of course, even when the ink is dry on every last regulation,
there will remain—as there always is—a constant push and pull between
regulators and the financial industry as market participants adjust to the
new rules of the road.
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Regulators need to remain vigilant. Because there is a constant
danger that putting a thumb in the dyke in one part of the financial
system will cause a leak to spring somewhere else.
A danger that well-intentioned reforms could push risk to everdarker corners of the financial system. To financial products not yet
envisioned by even the most far-sighted of regulators.
The lure of potential profits is too great. And the dynamism of the
global economy is too strong for the financial system to stand frozen in
time.
This is not to say—as some suggest—that the art of financial
regulation is a futile endeavor. That we should resign ourselves to a
financial system that forever careens from crisis to crisis.
Far from it.
It just means that we should approach the constantly evolving
landscape of the financial sector with a deep sense of humility about the
capacity of any one set of reforms or safeguards to permanently preserve
the stability of our kinetic, frenetic global financial system.
And this deep sense of humility shouldn’t fade with the passage of
time—when the 2008-09 financial crisis becomes a page in the history
books rather than a fresh wound.
To be sure, Dodd-Frank represents the most far-reaching set of
reforms to our financial system since the Great Depression.
But we can’t become complacent.
And one critical part of avoiding that fate—avoiding
complacency—is what I will call “healthy competition in financial
regulation.”
A dose of healthy competition among regulators is helpful and
necessary to safeguarding the stability of our nation’s financial system.
Not just today – but for the long term.
HEALTHY COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
So what do I mean by healthy competition in financial regulation?
It’s not so dissimilar to what economists talk about when they
discuss healthy competition in the broader economy.
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Or what Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis meant when he
called the states “laboratories” of democracy during the Progressive
Era.5
The New York State Department of Financial Services—or DFS as
we like to call it—was recently created through the merger of two
existing state agencies with long histories: the New York State Banking
Department (which was founded in 1851) and the New York State
Insurance Department (which was established in 1859).
However, DFS—in its current, unified structure—is only about 18
months old. So, in many ways, we’re the new regulator on the block.
The Federal Reserve has been around for about a century. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has been protecting
depositors since the Great Depression. And the U.S. Treasury
Department has served a vital role in managing our nation’s finances
since the founding of our republic.
At DFS, we’re fortunate to work with federal partners who have a
deep well of institutional knowledge and expertise—which complements
our own.
We’ve collaborated with our federal partners closely and
cooperatively on a number of issues of common interest.
Moreover, at DFS, like our other regulatory partners, we have a
commitment to thorough, thoughtful, diligent work.
But we also have another key attribute at DFS.
We’re nimble. And we’re agile. And we’re able to take a fresh
look at issues across the financial industry—both new and old.
Sometimes financial regulators find that moving in a new direction
is akin to turning a battleship in a bathtub. Institutional inertia can
stymie even the most well-intentioned of watchdogs.
But as a newly created regulator, DFS isn’t necessarily wedded to
existing ways of doing business.
Indeed, similar to the example of the broader economy, when
there’s a new entrant into the marketplace, it often spurs others to
reexamine existing processes and practices. To innovate.
At DFS, we can shine a spotlight wherever we think it needs
shining.
When banks are engaging in practices that threaten our country’s
financial stability and national security – we can take swift action.
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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When consumers are being abused – we can move rapidly to right
those wrongs.
Sometimes, that means DFS may be out in the lead on a particular
issue.
But I think that’s healthy. Not only for the financial regulatory
community, but for the long-term strength of the financial industry and
our nation’s economy.
Problems with Unhealthy Competition
Indeed, it may also be helpful to define healthy competition in
opposition to the type of unhealthy competition that we saw during the
lead up to the financial crisis.
When the system turned on its head and the debate turned to who
could water down standards the most.
Who could provide the “lightest touch” regulation at the firms they
oversaw.
In many ways, this created a race to the bottom in which both
regulators and Wall Street firms were willing participants.
At DFS, we hope our activism at the state level will at least
sometimes do the reverse and spur a race to the top.
Now, some people claim that being a strong and independent
regulator is at odds with the goals of promoting economic growth and
job creation.
That you have to be a laid back or passive regulator to be progrowth and pro-business.
We fundamentally disagree.
When Governor Cuomo—who himself played a vital role as a
financial watchdog when he was Attorney General—proposed creating
DFS, he gave us a clear mission.
He wanted the industries DFS regulates—banking and insurance—
to thrive. He wanted to keep New York the financial capital of the
world.
And he also wanted to protect consumers and investors better than
ever before by using all the tools in our tool-belt.
Those two goals can fit together. They are not mutually exclusive.
When consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors have confidence in
the integrity—the safety and the soundness—of their banks and insurers.
When they know they’re getting a fair deal. They’ll do more business
here.
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That’s better for the long-term health of the financial industry and
our economy. And it is certainly better for the long-term health of our
system to prevent future crises through smart and active regulation.
And it’s certainly not pro-business to regulate so lightly that we run
the risk of another meltdown.
With that in mind, I wanted to discuss a couple recent examples of
DFS actions that we hope will play an important, constructive role in
strengthening the long-term health of the financial system: first, a corner
of the insurance industry called “force-placed insurance,” and second,
anti-money laundering enforcement.
Additionally, I wanted to highlight a few other areas in financial
regulation that DFS is taking a hard look at right now—where healthy
competition may play a vital role going forward. Those include: (1)
conflicts of interest in the consulting industry; and (2) the troubling role
private equity firms are playing in insurance markets.
FORCE-PLACED INSURANCE
Let’s start with force-placed insurance.
In October 2011, the New York State Department of Financial
Services launched an investigation into the force-placed insurance
industry.
Force-placed insurance is insurance taken out by a bank—on behalf
of the homeowner—when a homeowner does not maintain the insurance
required by the terms of a mortgage.
This occurs most frequently when a homeowner allows their policy
to lapse—usually due to financial hardship.
So, these are folks who are already teetering on the edge of
financial disaster.
And, as the name implies, the insurance is forced upon them.
Now, in certain circumstances, this makes sense because the
mortgage holder has a right to protect their collateral (In this case, the
house).
But when we conducted our investigation, we found that there was
very little competition and very high rates in the force-placed insurance
industry.
Sometimes when a homeowner who was already in financial
trouble got “force-placed” into an insurance policy their rate jumped two
to ten times higher—despite the fact that force-placed insurance
provides far less protection for homeowners than voluntary insurance.
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Our investigation looked at why this was happening.
Normally, you’d expect that the bank would do what any of us
would do when they shop something. That they’d look for the best
product at the lowest price.
What we found is that the banks and the insurers had set up what is
essentially a form of reverse competition.
Banks were looking for high prices and high premiums. And they
were happy to pay them. Why? Because a good portion of the
premiums were being funneled back to the banks in the form of
commissions.
All of this, mind you, at the expense of homeowners and investors,
who ultimately got stuck with the bill.
In May, we held public hearings where we brought the industry and
homeowners to testify. And that hearing—along with our broader
investigation—really tore the cover off this issue.
DFS’s investigation has already produced a recent, major
settlement with the country’s largest force-placed insurer: Assurant.
Assurant controls seventy percent of the market in New York.
That settlement includes restitution for homeowners who were
harmed, a $14 million penalty paid to the State of New York, and
industry-leading reforms that will save homeowners, taxpayers, and
investors millions of dollars going forward through lower rates.
Indeed, through those reforms, we’re banning the type of practices
that drove premiums sky- high.
We’re kicking the kick-backs out of this industry.
Today, we announced an additional settlement with the nation’s
second-largest force-placed insurer, QBE, that includes a $10 million
penalty, restitution for homeowners, and New York’s industry-leading
reforms. Now, companies representing more than 90 percent of this
market in New York have signed onto our reforms.
When DFS began its investigation, force-placed insurance wasn’t
an area to which many regulators were paying close attention.
It was essentially a dirty little secret in the insurance industry.
But that’s started to change—at least in part—because DFS has
pushed very hard on this issue. Soon after DFS announced its settlement
with Assurant, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which regulates
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, followed our actions by
filing a notice to ban the lucrative fees and commissions paid by insurers
to banks on force-placed insurance.
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To spur further action, DFS also recently urged other state
regulators to use our settlement with Assurant as a national model.
Every regulator should be asking, “[i]f you can clean up things in New
York, why can’t you clean it up nationwide?”
We’ve received a good response from a number of states so far.
But the proof will be in the pudding.
If other states follow through, it will help end the kickback culture
that has pervaded this industry and hurt far too many homeowners and
investors.
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT
Another area where I think DFS has begun to play an important and
constructive role is anti- money laundering—which is so vital to our
country’s national security.
This was an area where we felt that, at times, the industry and our
regulatory structures had gotten used to a certain playing field. A
certain silently acknowledged level of consequences tied to a certain
quantum of illegal and immoral behavior.
And we felt that this was serious, serious conduct justifying more
potent action. And we wanted the banking industry to take it a lot more
seriously given the threat it posed not only to our financial system, but
to our national security.
Banks were sometimes effectively serving as financial conduits for
terrorists, other enemies of our country, and perpetrators of some of the
most vile human rights abuses anywhere on earth.
DFS took action against a particular bank last summer.
We felt like it was the right thing to do.
And we did it based on the facts and the law.
Our investigation uncovered that the bank had hidden from U.S.
and other regulators roughly 60,000 secret transactions involving at least
$250 billion—reaping the company hundreds of millions of dollars in
fees.
This conduct had left the U.S. financial system vulnerable and
deprived law enforcement investigators of crucial information used to
track all manner of criminal activity, including terrorism.
New York ended up securing a $340 million settlement and a set of
reforms to help put a stop to this behavior.
Initially, there was what we believed to be a misplaced focus on the
fact that DFS had acted more quickly, more robustly, and more
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independently than some people were used to from a state banking
regulator.
That focus was misplaced because it distracted everyone from the
very real issues at stake when it comes to international money
laundering on a massive scale for nations like Iran.
Ultimately, though, we certainly stimulated a debate nationally and
internationally on this issue.
And, more importantly, I think we started an alteration or, better
yet, a recalibration of the regulatory playing field going forward in this
area.
Now, you’re seeing more robust action taken – at both the state and
federal level – to root out this type of illegal money-laundering
That’s good for our national security. And it’s good for the
integrity—and the safety and soundness—of the broader financial
industry.
And it was driven in part by the sort of healthy competition I
mentioned earlier.
CONSULTING
Now, let me turn to a new set of issues on which DFS is very
focused right now. And where we hope, again, to play an essential role
in the weeks and months ahead.
The independence and integrity of monitors and independent
consultants is another area of vital concern to DFS.
These consultants are installed at banks and other companies
usually after an institution has committed serious regulatory violations
or broken the law. The intent is that monitors assist companies in
improving controls and ensuring that violations do not reoccur.
All too often, however, the outcome of a monitorship is
disappointing, as we recently saw in the context of the national
mortgage reviews. This can be blamed on a number of factors, but it is
worth considering that our current system significantly undermines the
independence of the monitors—the monitors are hired by the banks,
they’re embedded physically at the banks, they are paid by the banks,
and they depend on the banks for future business.
If the monitors or consultants are simply puppets of the big banks
that pay their fees—rather than independent voices—then their workproduct can hardly be deemed reliable.
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There is also insufficient communication between monitors and
regulators. Frequently, monitors never hear from regulators once they
are put in place at a bank. This is a problem we can and must fix.
It’s largely about “managing the monitors” and that is up to
regulators. There need to be regular meetings between regulators and
monitors. Expectations must be set. Weekly updates on progress should
be happening.
A good monitor can truly improve a troubled company when there
is a problem, but an ineffective monitor can make the situation much
worse by creating a false sense of security in the regulator and the
public.
At DFS, we have already instituted a more robust process in the
selection of monitors, and we will be pushing more broadly for change
in the dynamics between regulators, monitors and institutions.
You will likely be seeing some innovative initiatives from DFS in
this area in the coming weeks and months. And we expect that those
actions will help propel reform at both the state and federal levels.
One very important question we all need to be asking is when
monitors or consultants perform poorly or, worse, when they
intentionally obscure problems at banks: what should the consequences
be? Because if we allow intentional conduct aimed at quietly sweeping
problems at banks under the rug, we are truly undermining our whole
system of prudential regulation. At some point, we must take action that
has real consequences or the problems in our system will continue to be
perpetuated rather than deterred.
PRIVATE EQUITY BUYING ANNUITY COMPANIES
I’d now like to turn to an emerging trend in the insurance industry
that DFS has become concerned about.
Private equity firms are becoming active in the acquisition of
insurance companies. In the last few years, private equity firms have
been targeting fixed and indexed annuity writers.
For those who are unfamiliar with annuity companies—they sell
insurance products that essentially promise a certain payment every year
or month (whatever the terms of the policy may be) over a particular
period of time.
If you look at the deals completed or announced to date, private
equity-controlled insurers now account for nearly thirty percent of the
indexed annuity market (up from seven percent a year ago) and fifteen
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percent of the total fixed annuity market (up from four percent a year
ago).
These are large numbers, and they indicate a very rapid growth in
market share. As you may expect, that’s driving DFS to take a close
look at these transactions and these firms—to ensure that the safety and
soundness of these companies and consumers both remain protected.
Now, as you probably know, annuities are very popular products
that a significant number of Americans rely on to help finance their
retirements.
The risk that we’re concerned about at DFS is whether these private
equity firms are more short- term focused—when this is a business
that’s all about the long haul.
That their focus is on maximizing their immediate financial returns,
rather than ensuring that promised retirement benefits are there at the
end of the day for policyholders.
And—because of their potential short-term focus—here is a risk
that these companies may not be delivering the level of compliance and
customer service that we’d expect of them given the importance of this
product to so many seniors on fixed incomes.
There can be exceptions, but generally private equity firms follow a
model of aggressive risk- taking and high leverage, typically making
high-risk investments. If just a few of these investments work out, then
the firm can be very successful—and the failed ventures are just viewed
as a cost of doing business.
This type of business model isn’t necessarily a natural fit for the
insurance business, where a failure can put policyholders at significant
risk.
Private equity firms typically manage their investments with a
much shorter time horizon—for example, three to five years—than is
typically required for prudent insurance company management. They
may not be long-term players in the insurance industry and their shortterm focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and
leverage in order to boost short-term returns.
Now, at DFS, we regulate both banks and insurance companies.
And the differences between these two industries are quite striking when
it comes to private equity investments.
Private equity firms rarely acquire control of banks, not because
they are prohibited from doing so, but because the regulatory
requirements associated with such acquisitions are more stringent than a
private equity firm may like. These regulatory requirements in the
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banking industry are designed—in part—to encourage a long-term
outlook and ensure that the person controlling the company has real skin
in the game.
The long-term nature of the life insurance business raises similar
issues, yet under current regulations it is less burdensome for a private
equity firm to acquire an insurer than a bank.
We need to ask ourselves whether we need to modernize our
regulations to deal with this emerging trend to protect retirees and to
protect the financial system.
This is an area that not too many regulators are looking at. But it’s
one where DFS is moving to ramp up its activity.
And we hope that other regulators will soon follow suit.
SHADOW INSURANCE
Another area that we’re hard at work on relates to the use of what
are called captive insurance companies, used to quietly off-load risk and
increase leverage at some of the world’s largest financial firms.
In July 2012, the New York State Department of Financial Services
initiated a serious investigation into this somewhat obscure area that—
we believe—could put insurance policyholders and taxpayers at greater
risk.
Insurance companies use these captives to shift blocks of insurance
policy claims to special entities—often in states outside where the
companies are based, or else offshore (e.g., the Cayman Islands) —in
order to take advantage of looser reserve and oversight requirements.
(Reserves are funds that insurers set aside to pay policyholder claims.)
In a typical transaction, an insurance company creates a “captive”
insurance subsidiary, which is essentially a shell company owned by the
insurer’s parent. The company then “reinsures” a block of existing
policy claims through the shell company—and diverts the reserves that
it had previously set aside to pay policyholders to other purposes, since
the reserve requirements for the captive shell company are typically
lower. (Sometimes the parent company even effectively pays a
commission to itself from the shell company when the transaction is
complete.)
However, this financial alchemy, let’s call it “shadow insurance,”
does not actually transfer the risk for those insurance policies off the
parent company’s books because, in many instances, the parent
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company is ultimately still on the hook for paying claims if the shell
company’s weaker reserves are exhausted (“a parental guarantee”).
That means that when the time finally comes for a policyholder to
collect their promised benefits after years of paying premiums—such as
when there is a death in their family—there is a smaller reserve buffer
available at the insurance company to ensure that the policyholders
receive the benefits to which they are legally entitled.
We believe that shadow insurance also puts the stability of the
broader financial system at greater risk. Indeed, in a number of ways,
shadow insurance is reminiscent of certain practices used in the run-up
to the financial crisis, such as issuing subprime mortgage-backed
securities (“MBS”) through structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”) and
writing credit default swaps on higher-risk MBS. Those practices were
used to water down capital buffers, as well as temporarily boost
quarterly profits and stock prices at numerous financial institutions.
And ultimately, those practices left those very same companies on the
hook for hundreds of billions of dollars in losses from risks hidden in the
shadows and led to a multi-trillion dollar taxpayer bailout.
Similarly, shadow insurance could leave insurance companies less
able to deal with losses. The events at AIG’s Financial Products unit in
the lead up to the financial crisis demonstrate that regulators must
remain vigilant about potential threats lurking in unexpected business
lines and at more weakly capitalized subsidiaries within a holding
company system.
We are hard at work on our continuing investigation into shadow
insurance. And we hope to shed light on and further stimulate a national
debate on this important issue to our financial system.
CONCLUSION
Now, I’ve highlighted a number of areas where DFS has taken a
leadership role and sought to push reform.
But the role of state regulators can and should vary based on the
particular context.
It really comes down to a question of federalism—the relationship
between the states and the federal government.
What I will call collaborative or cooperative federalism is usually
the best kind of federalism. When we work closely and together and
symbiotically with our federal partners.
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A great example of this is what DFS has been doing to partner with
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in the areas of debt
collectors and payday lending.
In other areas, where there has been less focus on a particular issue
at the federal level, a form of persuasive federalism sometimes
emerges—where the state tries to lead by example and stimulate
national reform. DFS’s work in the force-placed insurance industry is a
great example.
On the far end of the spectrum is what I’ll call, for lack of a better
term, coercive federalism. Coercive federalism should be rare. But
sometimes it’s necessary. Sometimes a state must act alone to change
the rules of the game. DFS’s work on anti-money-laundering
enforcement is a good example here.
Now, I listed three types of federalism. But if I had to give them an
overarching label, I would call DFS’s overall approach going forward
catalytic federalism.
We will continue to evaluate the appropriate role of the state
regulator on an issue-by-issue basis, depending on the context.
As I noted at the beginning of the speech, we inhabit a constantly
evolving financial ecosystem. And we will remain nimble and agile as
we attempt to affect change wherever our ever-changing markets need
that stimulus.
Change is good. And a robust marketplace of ideas among
financial regulators is a key strength of our system.
Indeed, our federal regulators are leading on a number of important
issues.
Today, the Federal Reserve and Treasury—for example—are
leading the charge on two areas of vital concern to long-term financial
stability: money market reform and addressing potential sources of risk
in the tri-party repo market.
The SEC—together with its law enforcement partners—has fought
hard to crack down on insider trading. And the SEC is also working to
modernize investor disclosures in an era of Twitter, Facebook, and other
social media products that didn’t even exist a decade ago.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has taken a
leadership role in cracking down on past abuses in LIBOR and
proposing future reforms so that they don’t happen again.
The CFPB—led by Richard Cordray, who is just one of the bright,
shining stars of the Obama Administration – has staked out new ground
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in the fight to arm families with the clear, concise information they need
to make the financial choices that are best for them.
In recent years, the FDIC has really been ahead of the curve on the
issues of providing relief to struggling homeowners and ensuring banks
have the capital they need to withstand unexpected financial shocks and
losses.
The critical point is that through healthy competition—in this
marketplace of ideas—the best ideas will hopefully rise to the top.
That the ideas that withstand the informed scrutiny of fellow
regulators, the media, the public and other stakeholders will one day win
out. (Even if it’s not today.) And that those ideas come out better for
being battle tested.
I think our financial system, our economy, and our country will
ultimately be better for it. When regulators speak their mind, say their
peace and engage in a vigorous debate through healthy competition.
Thank you. And I look forward to taking your questions.

